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Abstract
Background: Early diagnosis of young adults at risk of schizophrenia is essential for preventive approaches of the illness.
Nevertheless, classic screening instruments are difficult to use because of the non-specific nature of the signs at this pre-
onset phase of illness. The objective of the present contribution was to propose an innovating test that can probe the more
specific symptom of psychosis, i.e., the sense of agency, which is defined as being the immediate experience of oneself as
the cause of an action. More specifically, we tested whether motor agency is abnormal in early psychosis.
Methods: Thirty-two young symptomatic patients and their age-matched controls participated in the study. 15 of these
patients were at ultra high-risk for developing psychosis (UHR), and 17 patients were suffering from first-episode psychosis
(FEP). Patients’ neurocognitive capacities were assessed through the use of seven neuropsychological tests. A motor agency
task was also introduced to obtain an objective indicator of the degree of sense of agency, by contrasting force levels
applied during other and self-produced collisions between a hand-held objet and a pendulum.
Results: As reported in the literature for adult controls, healthy adolescents used more efficient force levels in self than in
other-imposed collisions. For both UHR and FEP patients, abnormally high levels of grip force were used for self-produced
collisions, leading to an absence of difference between self and other. The normalized results revealed that motor agency
differentiated patients from controls with a higher level of sensitivity than the more classic neuropsychological test battery.
Conclusions: This study is in favour of the existence of an abnormal sense of agency early in the psychotic illness. Because it
is quick and none verbal, motor agency may be a valuable tool to use in complement to classic interviews, especially when
investigating complex ineffable experiences that are difficult to explicitly describe.
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Introduction
Psychosis describes a mental state characterized by distortion or
loss of contact with reality and may involve severe disturbances in
cognition, behaviour, and emotion. It can be associated to different
types of symptoms, one of which may be the positive symptoms that
include delusions, hallucinations and thought disorders. Most
individuals with schizophrenia, which is the most common of
psychosis, experience onset during late adolescence or early
adulthood. This initial episode of psychotic disorders can thus be
particularly traumatic both for the individuals and their family as it
occurs during the key moment in life for the development of
identity, relationships and long-term vocational plans. Hence, a
particular interest has emerged for the early phase of schizophrenia,
including the pre-onset of the illness, i.e., the prodromal period.
This is particularly true as more and more evidence show that early
clinical intervention, i.e., when the disorder is not yet entrenched,
may improve the longer-term outcome of patient [1,2] and even
reduce the duration of untreated psychoses [3].
However, how to provide adequate care to those young
adolescences at clinical risk of developing psychosis (Ultra High
Risk individuals) remains an unanswered question. This is
especially true, as the detection of the emergence of psychosis is
rendered difficult by the non-specificity of the prodromal signs and
symptoms [4]. The objective of the present contribution was to
propose an innovating motor test that might probe the more
specific symptom of psychosis, i.e., the sense of agency. This highly
sensitive measure could then in a midterm improve the predictive
validity of early diagnosis.
Today, the most widely used screening tool for identifying
individuals suffering from attenuated psychotic symptoms and
thus, at imminent risk for onset of a psychotic disorder is the
Comprehensive Assessment of At Risk Mental State (CAARMS)
scale [5,6,7]. This instrument is based on a ‘‘close-in’’ strategy that
combines different risk factors including, e.g., the peak age range
for onset of psychotic disorder, the presence of subthreshold
psychotic symptoms and signs, family history of psychotic
disorders and functional decline [8,9]. This semi-structured
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interview provides the means to specify whether an individual
meets the Ultra High Risk (UHR) criteria. However, despite the
promising identification results obtained with the CAARMS, a
recent study investigating the predictive validity of the UHR
criteria reported a much lower transition rate (16%) [10] than that
reported in the initial cohorts (greater than 40% - for a review see
Haroun et al. [11]). More specifically, it was demonstrated that a
greater number of ‘‘false positive’’ cases were identified. This may
be due to the fact that the questions in the CAARMS do not target
the subtle and infraliminary signs that characterise the prodromal
phase of psychosis such as basic anomalies in the bodily experi-
ences of self.
Phenomenological studies have argued that the basic sense of
self may be one of the earliest and most fundamental features of
the abnormal self-disturbance experiences reported in patients
suffering from psychosis [12,13,14,15]. This abnormal sense of self
would include: (a) a diminished sense of the minimal self, with an
inner void and a lack of identity; (b) a distorted first-person
perspective, with a pervasive and fluctuating limit between self and
the outer-world; (c) an abnormally intensified reflectivity with a
circular repetition of thoughts. In UHR individuals, these
alterations of the sense of self are rarely of pathological intensity,
and it is only during the psychotic transition that they become
thematised within the emerging positive symptoms, such as
delusions of control and hallucinations. As a consequence, it is
difficult to quantify these disturbances at the early stage of the
disease, and more particularly through a verbal interview such as
the CAARMS, since (1) self- disturbances are so strange, that young
patients hesitate to express them, and (2) even in the situations for
which patients do try to describe their state, the phenomena are so
ineffable that they find themselves short of words.
Explicit reports from patients have described an abnormal sense
of self as leading to an artificial distance between the body that is
moving, and the experience of being. This alienated self-
experience would be expressed through thoughts as well as actions
leading to abnormal sense of agency. In this way, it has been
proposed that one of the most basic components of the sense of self
may be the sense of agency, which has recently been defined by
Gallagher [16] as being the immediate experience of oneself as the
cause of an action.
Based on the empirical evidence that self-disturbances may be a
core feature of schizophrenia and present during the prodromal
phase of schizophrenia [15], we have developed the use of a motor
agency task [17,18,19] to probe the degree of self-disturbances in
individuals at clinical risk of developing schizophrenia (UHR
individuals). Indeed, we have proposed the use of the collision
paradigm [20] because it requires neither reflective responses nor
explicit judgments. It provides the means to reveal behaviourally a
difference in experiential states between a situation for which the
participant is an active agent of the initiation of a collision, and the
contrasting situation for which the same participant is passively
experiencing collisions that are initiated by someone else. The
term ‘‘collision’’ is used because concretely, the subjects’ task is to
use a hand-held object to resist impacts that are produced as a
consequence of the collision between the hand-held object and a
pendulum (see Figure 1). The degree of agency is investigated by
contrasting two conditions. In the first, the pendulum is released
by the experimenter (other-released, task O). In the second, the
pendulum is released by the participants themselves (self-released,
task S). As described in previous studies, a distorted sense of agency
is associated to a low-degree of agency, i.e., similar levels of grip
force efficiency are applied on the hand-held object when the
pendulum is self released (task S) and when the pendulum release is
triggered by someone else (task O). Conversely, a preserved sense of
agency is characterised by a significant difference in grip force
efficiency between task S and task O.
The originality of this paradigm is to explore the contribution of
the pure efferent-based mechanisms by measuring grip force levels
at the specific time of impact. Because the duration of the impacts
is very short (,30 ms), feedback mechanisms that take a minimum
of 90 ms to intervene do not have the time to implement a
functional change in grip force adjustments. Thus, we propose that
our measure provides the means to probe the participants’
immediate experience of being agent or not of that event, without
contamination from higher-order cognitive functions mediated
through afferent and reflective feedback loops.
Through the use of the collision paradigm, the aim here was
first to see whether the sense of agency was indeed perturbed as
early as the prodromal phase of psychosis, and to compare these
results to those observed in first episode young patients. The
second objective was to measure basic motor performances and
neurocognitive functions to confirm the none-specificity of general
cognitive deficits that are at a sub-pathological intensity. Finally,
we aimed at revealing that because it targets the core symptom of
psychosis, the motor agency tool is more sensitive than the general
neuropsychological battery to detect the emergence of prodromal
symptoms.
Materials and Methods
Subjects
Thirty-two patients were recruited from a private clinic
specialised in the care of adolescents and young adults suffering
from mental health diseases, aged between 13 and 25 years of age.
Their global functioning was evaluated through the use of the
Global Assessment of Functioning Scale (GAF), from the DSM-IV
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994). The mean daily dose in
chlorpromazine equivalents was also measured. Exclusion criteria
were IQ under 70, neurological disorder and drug dependence.
First-episode psychosis - FEP Group. Patients, who were
admitted to the clinic after a first episode of psychosis, were
assessed for diagnoses purposes with the Structured Clinical
Interview from the DSM-IV Axis I Disorders. Seventeen patients
were included and for each, duration of illness was calculated as
the time elapsed since first hospitalisation. Symptom severity was
evaluated using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale
(PANSS [21]). These patients were aged between 16 and 23 years.
Ultra High Risk - UHR Group. All patients admitted to the
clinic and who did not present a first episode of psychotic illness
underwent the semi-structured CAARMS interview, which is
Figure 1. Motor agency task. Illustration of the collision paradigm
that was used to estimate the degree of sense of agency experienced
by each individual for two different types of events. LEFT: other-
triggered collisions with a pendulum that was released by the
experimenter; RIGHT: self-produced collisions with a pendulum that
was released by the participants. Under both conditions, the subjects
were required to remain the hand-held objet immobile and to stop the
fall of the pendulum.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030449.g001
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specifically designed to monitor pre-pyschotic symptomatology
[6]. Fifteen young individuals fulfilled the UHR criteria, with ages
ranging from 13 to 23.5 years.
Adolescent – ADO Group. Thirty-six healthy young adults
aged between 13.5 and 24 years were recruited through local city
advertisement, and constituted the control group.
Demographics for the three groups are presented in Table 1. The
present study was approved by the local ethics committee: ‘‘Comite´
d’e´thique en sciences du comportement de l’Universite´ de Lille 3’’.
All participants provided written informed consent after the
procedure had been fully explained. In the case of subjects under
18 years of age, parental consent was obtained by both parents.
Neurocognitive tests
Seven neuropsychological tests were used to assess neurocogni-
tive function (see Figure 2 BOTTOM). The test battery took
2 hours to complete and was administered in two independent
sessions. In addition, the Subjective Scale To Investigate
Cognition in Schizophrenia (SSTICS) was proposed [22]. This
21-item self-report questionnaire aimed at exploring those
cognitive complaints frequently reported as being impaired in
schizophrenia (i.e., memory, attention, executive functions,
language and praxia). The total score of the scale only was used.
Maximum score was 84, with greater scores revealing higher levels
of cognitive complaint.
Motor agency task
To evaluate the motor and agency capacities of the participants,
the collision paradigm was used [20]. The subjects’ task was to use
a hand-held object to resist impacts produced by the collision
between the hand-held object and a pendulum (see Figure 1).
Subjects were required to remain immobile and stop the fall of the
pendulum that could be released either by the subjects themselves
(self-released, task S) or by the experimenter (other-released, task O).
Under all conditions, the hand-held object was fitted with a force
transducer (Mini40, ATI Industrial Automation) that provided the
means to quantify the level of grip force (GF) applied by the
subject throughout each trial (in Newtons, N).
The subject’s capacity to interact efficiently with the pendulum
was evaluated on each and every trial by measuring the Safety
Margin (SM), which is an indicator of the excess grip force (GF)
employed at the time of impact, with Safety Margin = (Grip
Force/Load Force)/Slip Ratio6100%. As suggested by the
equation, the smaller the safety margin, the more efficient the
interaction [20]. The objective indicator of the motor Sense
of Agency (SoA) was then taken as the safety margin
difference between other-released and self-released
collisions [17]. Subjects were tested within a single 25-minute
session and performed a total of 24 trials.
Statistical method and dependent variables
In a first series of analyses, nonparametric statistics were used to
reveal Group effects (FEP vs. UHR vs. ADO) and Condition
effects (Task O vs. Task S). These analyses were conducted with a
significance level set at p=0.05. Concerning measures of motor
performance (see Figure 3) and agency the following dependent
variables were used, extracted from the grip force (GF)
measurements:
Table 1. Demographic characteristics and clinical descriptions of the two clinical groups.
Characteristics
FEP group
(N=17)
UHR group
(N=15)
Between-Patients
groups Differences
ADO control
group (N=36)
Between –Group Differences
(ADO versus patients)
Demographic Characteristics N % N %
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov(Z) p N %
Kruskal-Wallis
(X2) p
Female 8 47 8 53 23 64
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age 20.16 2.62 18.04 2.88 1.218 .036 19.1 3.3 3.171 .205
Education 10.35 2 10.27 2.12 0.255 .999 12.6 2.92 9.399 .009
Clinical Characteristics Mean SD
Positive and Negative Syndrome scale
Positive Component 22.47 7.7
Negative Component 20.7 6.6
Excitative Component 6.18 2.9
Depreciation Component 11.82 4
Desorganisation Component 16,47 4.98
Global Assessment of Functioning
Scales Scores
48.7 15.3 54.83 9.12 1.306 .066
Duration of illness (weeks) 83.44 49.9
Treatment measures (dose per day
at testing)
Chlorpromazine equivalents (mg) 261.79 328.25 161.25 161 0.732 .658
Lorazepam equivalents (mg) 3.71 3.71 1.85 0.78 0.745 .635
N % N %
Untreated 2 12 5 33
Drug or Alcohol abuse 4 24 4 27
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030449.t001
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GFtiming: time interval between GF peak and time of
impact, in milliseconds
GFplanning: time interval between start of GF increase
and impact, in milliseconds
GFbaseline: force level before pendulum release (first
500 ms of the trial), in Newtons
SoAindicator: differences in safety margin (SM) between
other and self tasks, in % of excess force
In a second analysis, the sensitivity values of the motor agency
parameters and of the neurocognitive tests were calculated as the
ratio of (True Positive) over (True Positive+False Negative). True
Positive refers to the number of patients identified as having
performances that were of pathological level. Conversely, False
Negative refers to the number of patients whose performances are
not identified as being pathological whereas they should have
been. In the present work, we postulated that all patients should
present pathological scores even if it was not possible to verify the
outcome of the UHR patients.
Results
Clinical measures
The clinical groups did not differ with respect to mean age,
number of completed years of education, and global functioning
scores (GAF). To note, the GAF levels were weak for both clinical
groups, and tended to be even lower in the UHR group compared
to the FEP group (P=0.066).
At the moment of testing, seven patients were totally untreated
(2 FEP; 5 UHR). Overall, 37.5% of the patients were not receiving
antipsychotic medication: 17.64% for the FEP group (N= 3); 60%
for the UHR group (N= 9). The medicated patients were receiving
Figure 2. Neurocognitive tests and results. In the neuropsychological test battery, seven neurocognitive domains were assessed for reasoning,
attention, executive function, logical memory, spatial memory, short-term memory and processing speed. BOTTOM: for each cognitive domain, the
test that was specifically used is defined. TOP: the mean z-scores obtained for the two clinical groups are reported. To note that a value is considered
as pathological for a z-score smaller than 21.5 (see Eustache & Faure, 2005).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030449.g002
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second-generation antipsychhotics with the exception of one
patient. In the FEP group, patients were receiving risperidone
(N= 6), aripiprazole (N= 5), olanzapine (N=1), amisulpride
(N= 1) and haloperidol (N= 1). Four patients were also receiving
antidepressants. In the UHR group, patients were receiving
risperidone (N= 1), aripiprazole (N= 2) and olanzapine (N=3).
Two patients were also receiving antidepressants.
Neurocognitive evaluations
Raw test scores for both clinical groups were standardized for
age using z-score transformations (mean= 0, standard devia-
tion= 1) provided by tests norms. Consequently, the neurocogni-
tive test battery was not run in the ADO group. A z-score below
21.5 was considered as pathological as proposed by Eustache &
Faure [23].
Mean results are presented in Figure 2 TOP, and reveal modest
neurocognitive deficits in both UHR and FEP groups, across
the multiple investigated domains. Furthermore, no significant
Group differences were found in any of the seven investigated
neurocognitive domains: reasoning (Z= 0.588; P=0.879); atten-
tion (Z= 0.514; P=0.954); executive function (Z= 0.556; P=
0.916); logical memory (learning curve) (Z = 0.624; P=0.830);
spatial memory (Z= 0.588; P=0.879); short term memory
(Z= 0.945; P=0.334); processing speed (Z= 0.756; P=0.617).
The results of the SSTICS revealed the presence of important
subjective cognitive complaints with no significant between Group
differences, with a mean total score of 37.7 (SD=10.9) in the
UHR group and of 37.8 (SD=11.5) in the FEP group (Z=0.271;
P= .711). With a span ranging from 17 to 60, these levels of
complaints are even higher than those reported in previous studies
of large samples of chronic patients suffering from schizophrenia
[22,24]. These scores confirm the mental stress suffered by the
young adults participating in the present study.
Measures of motor performance and agency
Motor control. For the timing aspect of motor control, mean
GFtiming was calculated and revealed an absence of Group
difference with GF peak occurring within 30 ms of impact time
for all groups in task S: UHR (32 SD 12 ms), FEP (25.6 SD 19 ms)
and ADO (27.2 SD 12 ms) [X2(2) = 0.441; P=0.802], and in task
O: UHR (32 SD 13 ms), FEP (32 SD 16 ms) and ADO (28.6 SD
14 ms) [X2(2) = 4.03; P=0.133]. For the scaling aspect of motor
control, GF levels at the time of impact were significantly
correlated to the impact force of the forthcoming collision,
indicating that all subjects applied greater levels of force when
expecting bigger impacts. This was true for all groups (ADO:
rs = 0.678; FEP: rs = 0.298; UHR: rs = 0.367) and in both tasks
(task S: rs = 0.447; task O: rs = 0.477). For the planning aspect of
motor control, mean GFplanning was computed and revealed an
absence of Group difference with similar time interval between
start of GF increase and impact for all groups in task S: UHR (202
SD 55 ms), FEP (227.5 SD 50 ms), and ADO (220 SD 65 ms)
[X2(2) = 0.329; P=0.84], and in task O: UHR (206 SD 54 ms),
FEP (188 SD 29 ms), and ADO (186 SD 27 ms) [X2(2) = 0.044;
Figure 3. Motor performance measures. This graph presents (top) the grip force (GF) adjustments recorded over the course of a single typical
trial for a UHR patient. The two bottom graphs show the impact force applied on the pendulum head at the time of impact, and the variations in
angle of pendulum swing, respectively, over the course of the same trial.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030449.g003
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P=0.978]. Overall, these observations indicate preserved motor
coordination and motor planning in both clinical groups.
Force control. Baseline force measures revealed a main effect
of Group [X2(2) = 29.72; P=0.001], with greater GFbaseline levels
in the UHR group (16 SD 9 N) and in the FEP group (9.8 SD 9 N)
than in the ADO group (4.5 SD 4 N). This overall lack of
efficiency was further confirmed when calculating mean SM,
which indicated that an excess of GF was employed at the time of
impact in the ADO group (51.8 SD 18%), but that the levels of
excess force were significantly greater in the clinical groups
[X2(2) = 340.485; P=0.001], with the patients in the UHR group
(80.7 SD 14%) being even less efficient than those in the FEP
group (68.5 SD 19%) – [Z=3.660; P=0.001].
Motor agency. Motor agency was estimated as the difference
in Safety Margin (SM) between other-released (Task O) and self-
released (Task S) collisions, SM being an indicator of the excess
grip force employed at the time of impact. Results for this
parameter are presented in Figure 4. For the ADO group, the
Condition effect was significant [Z Wilcoxon=23.425; P=
0.001], revealing greater efficiency in task S (47.9 SD 21%) than
in task O (57.4 SD 24%). These results confirm an absence of SoA
abnormalities in the ADO group, with the capacity to optimize the
motor efficiency of motor adjustments when agent of the collision.
These results resemble those reported previously in healthy adults
[20]. In the UHR group, the Condition effect between tasks O and
S was none significant [Z Wilcoxon=20.301; P=0.764]
suggesting an absence of efficiency difference between task S (79
SD 17%) and task O (80 SD 16%). In the FEP group, the
Condition effect between tasks O and S was significant [Z
Wilcoxon=25.482; P=0.001]. However, in contrast to that
observed in the ADO group, FEP patients were less efficient in
task S (70 SD 20%) than in task O (65 SD 23%).
In order to quantify possible Group6Task interactions, we
conducted two non-parametric analyses independently for each
Experimental group. Results revealed an absence of Group
difference in task O [X2(2) = 3.388; P=0.183]. However, Group
effect was significant in task S [X2(2) = 16.839; P=0.002], with
similar results in the two patient groups (P= .611). Overall, these
results suggest abnormal agency experiences in both clinical
groups with a significant alteration of the sense of agency, for self-
controlled events specifically.
Evaluating test sensitivity
The sensitivity values of the 7 neurocognitive tests, on the one
hand, and of the parameters of the motor agency task, on the other
hand, were calculated after collapsing the two clinical samples
together. Results revealed relatively low sensitivity values for the
neurocognitive tests: reasoning: 0.18; attention: 0.34; executive
function: 0.25; logical memory: 0.09; spatial memory: 0.06; short
term memory: 0.13; processing speed: 0.31. For the motor agency
parameters, the following results were obtained: GFbaseline: 0.40;
GFplanning: 0.05; SoAindicator: 0.69.
These later results reveal that the parameter of the motor
agency is overall more sensitive than the neuropsychological tests
classically used. With the greatest sensitivity of all, it is possible that
SoAindicator may be more predictive than more general cognitive
tests for the early detection of the prodromal phase of psychosis.
Discussion
The concept of agency is related to those phenomenological
transactions with the world, in which our basic sense of self and the
sense of immersion in the world are inseparable [25]. In healthy
controls, the sense of agency would thus express itself in a tacit and
automatic fashion, through interactive activities with the sur-
rounding world. Conversely, an abnormal sense of agency would
lead to a basic perturbed sense of self, with an artificial distance
between the body that is moving, and the experience of being.
Objective and results of the study: summary
In the present study, we used a motor agency task to probe the
degree of sense of self as being the agent of a collision between a
hand-held object and a pendulum. By calculating the efficiency
difference between self-initiated and other-imposed collisions, we
showed that the sense of agency in healthy young adolescents (13
to 24 years) is similar to that previously evaluated in older adults
(greater than 30 years –Delevoye-Turrell et al. [20]). This sense of
agency was however abnormal in both young adults suffering from
Figure 4. Motor agency perturbation in both clinical groups. Graphic representation of the mean safety margin (SM in %) for the two
experimental tasks (O: other-released task; S: self-released task), for the three experimental Groups: adolescent controls (ADO, N= 36); first-episode
psychosis (FEP, N= 17); Ultra High Risk (UHR, N= 15).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030449.g004
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first episode psychosis (FEP) and in those patients detected as being
at ultra high risk of developing psychosis (UHR). Our results thus
confirm that the sense of agency is perturbed at an early stage of
the illness. Such conclusions echo the phenomenological descrip-
tions that have argued that the sense of self is one of the earliest
and most fundamental features of the abnormal self-disturbance
experiences reported in patients suffering from psychosis [13,14].
In addition, we demonstrated that motor agency differentiates
patients from controls with a higher level of sensitivity than the
more classic neuropsychological test battery. As such, it may be
valuable to include the motor agency indicator in clinical
screening procedures in order to increase the predictive power
of the UHR criteria.
Motor deficits do not explain Motor agency
abnormalities
One of the innovating aspects of our work approach was to
quantify motor dysfunctions through the use of a force transducer.
Indeed, probably due to the limited availability of motor
measurement tools, the motor domain is under investigated in
the field of psychiatry. In the few studies that have been concerned
with movement, (1) retrospective observations were conducted on
childhood home movies of schizophrenia patients [26] and (2)
prospective observations were run on standardized videotaped
footage of the action of eating in offspring of schizophrenic adults
[27]. Prospectively studies have also been conducted on unselected
birth cohorts [28,29] and overall, authors report neurological soft
signs, poor motor skills and deviances on motor coordination in
childhood of to-become patients.
Recently, videotapes were used to investigate the relation
between movement abnormalities and prodromal symptoms
[30,31]. In one of their studies, movement abnormalities were
coded from videotapes of 40 adolescents at risk of psychosis.
Interestingly, comparisons of converted and nonconverted partic-
ipants at baseline indicated that the groups who converted
exhibited significantly more movement abnormalities, suggesting
that individuals with elevated movement abnormalities may
represent a subgroup of prodromal adolescents who are at the
highest risk to develop the illness. Thus, given these findings, we
conducted a study in which motor dysfunctions could accurately
be described, taken into account both the timing and scaling
aspects of movement control.
Motor timing and motor efficiency were evaluated using a
hand-held object fitted with a simple force transducer. Results
revealed good motor timing, with peak grip force occurring close
to the time of impact in both clinical groups. Peak grip force was
scaled to the magnitude of the forthcoming collision, confirming
that all patients were able to adjust motor response in a predictive
matter to the forthcoming impact [32]. Nevertheless, motor
efficiency variations revealed that patients used abnormally high
force levels at baseline compared to aged-matched controls,
confirming certain aspects of the neurological soft signs previously
reported. These findings are also consistent with results demon-
strating that self-generated forces are less attenuated in schizo-
phrenia patients in comparison with healthy subjects, thereby
enhancing higher grip force levels [33]. Importantly, in the present
study motor dysfunctions where similar in all points, under both
collision tasks (Self and Other).
Motor agency is impaired in early psychosis
The critical aspect of our protocol is the contrast between the
task of arresting the fall of a pendulum that was initiated by the
experimenter (Task Other) or that was initiated by the subject
(Task Self). The motor efficiency differences between self and
other, measured at the time of impact was then taken as the
indicator of his/her immediate experience as an agent of that
collision. Hence, an absence of efficiency differences between these
two conditions (Self and Other) will reveal an altered sense of
agency.
Results revealed that healthy adolescents were significantly
more efficient when the pendulum release was self-initiated than
when it was released by the experimenter suggesting that healthy
individuals pre-reflectively experience self-initiated events as
different from externally initiated ones. These findings confirm
those previously reported in older adults reporting best efficiency
for the self-controlled situations whether acting in impoverished
environment or not [20].
The motor agency indicator revealed however abnormal results
in both of the patient groups. More specifically, force levels in the
self-controlled task were abnormally scaled. On the one hand,
UHR patients set similarly force levels for task-S and task-O,
suggesting that they experienced both types of collisions as similar,
whether they were agent of pendulum release or not. On the other
hand, FEP patients were even less efficient in Task-S than in Task-
O, with an inverse pattern of results than the age-matched
controls. These findings are similar to those described in chronic
schizophrenia [17,34], suggesting an early deficit in the sense of
agency in psychotic illnesses. Our results also agree with findings of
a recent study, using time judgment of action, which reported
distortions of sense of agency in putative psychotic prodrome
[35,36].
Neuropsychological evaluation is less sensitive than
motor agency
Through the use of a neurocognitive tests battery, we obtained a
precise clinical description of the patients who participated in the
present study. In doing so, we confirmed relatively poor
neuropsychological abilities in both the UHR and the FEP
patients with scores for sustained attention, executive function and
processing speed that were close to being pathological. The results
presented here resemble previous findings for first episode
psychosis [36] as well as for UHR individuals and young adults
at genetic risk [37,38,39,40]. To note is the fact that the levels of
global functioning in our UHR group were as weak as that
reported by Brewer and collaborators [37] for those UHR patients
who truly did develop full-blown psychosis. This argues in favour
for the fact that the individuals in our UHR group, truly are in a
putative prodromal psychotic phase, even if it will remain
unknown how many of these individuals will truly go on to
develop psychosis.
Finally, statistical analyses provided us the means to reveal low
sensibility values for the cognitive tests that are classically used in
clinical interviews (values ranging from 0.09, for memory to 0.34,
for attention). These values were all lower than those found for the
motor parameters. Interestingly, the sense of agency indicator was
the one that revealed to be the most sensitive to distinguish
pathological from none pathological individuals, suggesting that
the motor agency task may be a valuable tool to use in
complement to classic screening interviews in order to help detect
individuals at risk of psychosis.
Conclusions
We have reported the importance of considering quantifying
methods as complementary to classic questionnaires, especially
when investigating subjective experiences that are difficult to
verbalise. The motor agency indicator is a simple non-verbal test
that provides within 20 minutes an objective indication of the
degree of alterations of the sense of agency, one of the most
Motor Agency in the Prodromal Phase of Psychosis
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fundamental features of the schizophrenic spectrum [41]. With a
high degree of sensitivity, motor agency could be an important
parameter to include in clinical screening to increase the predictive
power of the UHR criteria for early diagnosis.
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